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Available online 5 February 2016Characterized by a tendency to guiltlessly exploit and manipulate others (Hare, 2003), psychopathy has been
labeled a disorder of moral faculties (Maibom, 2014). The association between psychopathy and moral
transgressions has often been viewed as a consequence of lacking empathetic concern for others (Blair, 2007).
The current study further explored the association between psychopathy and morality by isolating the factors
and facets most salient to the prediction of moral transgressions. Additionally, the current study examined
whether this association was moderated by gender. A sample of 557 undergraduates completed a measure of
psychopathy and responded to a series of personal-moral dilemmas. Results indicated that personal-harm
endorsement was most strongly associated with the interpersonal manipulative traits of psychopathy. This
association was not moderated by gender. The results of this study inform the understanding of factors that
may lead individuals higher in psychopathy to engage in immoral behavior.








Characterized by a tendency to guiltlessly exploit and manipulate
others (Hare, 2003), often through violent means (e.g., Leistico,
Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008), psychopathy has been labeled a
disorder of moral faculties (Maibom, 2014). Research suggests that
individuals higher in psychopathy are more likely than individuals
lower in psychopathy to endorse immoral behavior involving harm
(physical or emotional; Blair, 2007). While this utilitarian bias is often
attributed to emotional dysfunction (e.g., Blair, 2007; Glenn, Raine, &
Schug, 2009), the characteristics of psychopathy most salient to harm
endorsement have yet to be identiﬁed. To better understand this asso-
ciation, it is essential to consider the inﬂuence of speciﬁc psychopathic
traits rather than psychopathy in general.
1.1. Moral reasoning
Numerous theories have been developed in an attempt to explain
the process in which harmful behaviors are judged as right (moral) or
wrong (immoral). Traditionally, moral decisions were attributed to
conscious reasoning and age-related changes in moral development
(Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983). Theorists have sinceRitchie),emphasized the role of emotion (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). According to the dual-
process theory, moral dilemmas can be classiﬁed as personal or imper-
sonal (Greene et al., 2001). Personal-moral dilemmas involve deciding
whether it is appropriate to cause serious harm to a person without
deﬂecting a pre-existing threat. For example, this may involve deciding
whether it is appropriate to save ﬁve workmen from a runaway trolley
by pushing a stranger off a footbridge. Conversely, impersonal-moral di-
lemmas involve deciding whether it is appropriate to cause serious
harm by deﬂecting a pre-existing threat. Thus, this may involve decid-
ing whether it is appropriate to pull a lever that diverts the trolley
onto a sidetrack, killing one person instead of ﬁve. Neurobiological stud-
ies provide evidence that distinct processes are utilized during
personal- and impersonal-moral reasoning, where emotions are be-
lieved to inﬂuence personal-moral decisions and cognitive reasoning
is believed to inﬂuence impersonal-moral decisions (e.g., Greene &
Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001). Thus, it is possible that the affective re-
sponse elicited during personal-moral reasoning may discourage some
people from endorsing immoral behaviors.
1.1.1. Gender differences
Although ample research has conceptualized the process of moral
reasoning, there is a surprising absence of literature exploring gender
differences. According to Gilligan (1982), men tend to take a justice-
oriented approach (i.e., rationally respecting the law) whereas women
tend to take a care-oriented approach (i.e., emotion).While this distinc-
tion is evident in the literature examining gender differences in criminal
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evidence supporting gender differences in moral reasoning has been
mixed. Speciﬁcally, while some researchers have provided evidence
that men are more likely to endorse utilitarian responses to personal
moral dilemmas than women (e.g., Fumagalli et al., 2010; Milanowicz
& Bokus, 2013), others have suggested thatmen andwomen are equally
likely to approach moral decisions from a justice-oriented perspective
(Clapton & Sorrell, 1993; Galotti, 1989). Notably, no studies have iden-
tiﬁed higher rates of utilitarian endorsement among females than
males. One characteristic that has consistently been associated with
utilitarianism however, is psychopathy.
1.2. Characteristics of psychopathy
Psychopathy is a collection of maladaptive personality traits cha-
racterized by interpersonal (e.g., manipulative), affective (e.g., shallow
emotions), behavioral (e.g., impulsive), and antisocial features
(e.g., diverse criminal behavior; Hare, 2003). The absence of conscience
among individuals higher in psychopathy allows them to engage in
behaviors most others would be inhibited from acting upon (Hare,
2006). While these behaviors are often violent in nature (Hare, 2006),
psychopathy has also been identiﬁed as a characteristic of more general
criminal behavior (e.g., Leistico et al., 2008). A recent meta-analysis by
Blais, Solodukhin, and Forth (2014) suggests psychopathy is equally
related to instrumental (e.g., committing assault for the purpose of
stealing a purse) and reactive violence (e.g., committing assault as an
impulsive response to provocation).
Traditionally, discussions of psychopathy have revolved around a
two-factormodel (e.g., Hare, 1991),where Factor 1 represents the inter-
personal and affective features, and Factor 2 represents the lifestyle and
antisocial features. These factors have since been divided into four
facets, where Factor 1 has been subdivided into the (1) interpersonal
and (2) affective facets, and Factor 2 has been subdivided into the
(3) lifestyle and (4) antisocial facets (Hare, 2003). This model has
been replicated across a variety of populations and measures
(e.g., community, offender; Kosson et al., 2013; Neumann, Kosson,
& Salekin, 2007).
1.2.1. Gender differences
It has been suggested that the prevalence rate of psychopathy differs
across gender. A recent systematic review by Beryl, Chou, and Vollm
(2014) provides evidence that psychopathy is less prevalent among
women offenders than men offenders. Similar results have been iden-
tiﬁed among non-institutionalized samples, where women tend to
receive lower psychopathy scores than men (e.g., Borroni, Somma,
Andershed, Maffei, & Fossati, 2014).
1.3. Psychopathy and moral reasoning
Given the association between psychopathy and criminal behavior,
it is not surprising that psychopathy has been labeled a disorder of
moral faculties (e.g.,Maibom, 2014). Across clinical and subclinical sam-
ples, individuals higher in psychopathy tend to endorse personal-moral
harm more often than individuals lower in psychopathy (e.g., Arvan,
2013; Bartel & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt,
2009; Levenston, Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 2000; Patil, 2015). Cleckley
(1941) was the ﬁrst to refer to individuals higher in psychopathy as
‘moral imbeciles’, speculating that their willingness to harm others
reﬂected a lack of moral understanding. Contrary to Cleckley's (1941)
hypothesis, recent research suggests that individuals higher in psychop-
athy are able to distinguish between moral and immoral behavior
(Aharoni, Sinnott-Armstrong, & Kiehl, 2014; Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser,
2010). With evidence of moral understanding, Cima et al. (2010) pro-
pose that individuals higher in psychopathy tend to endorse immoral
behavior because they do not care how their actions impact others.
Although limited, research has yet to identify gender differences inmoral understanding among individuals higher in psychopathy. Specif-
ically, with a sample of offenders, Aharoni et al. (2014) found no inter-
action between gender and psychopathy when predicting moral
understanding (Aharoni et al., 2014).
Researchers have recently begun exploring the characteristics of
psychopathy associated with immoral behavior (e.g., Glenn et al.,
2009; Patil, 2015). Patil (2015) provides evidence that the association
between psychopathy and utilitarianism may be driven by the traits
comprising Factor 1 (e.g., manipulative, callous). Researchers have also
suggested that individuals higher in psychopathy tend to engage in
harmful behavior because they lack elements of empathy (i.e., concern
for others; Glenn et al., 2009). For example, when exposed to emotion-
ally provocative stimuli (e.g., distress cues), individuals higher in
psychopathy show reduced brain activity in regions associated with
empathy (e.g., amygdala; Levenston et al., 2000). Recently, Glenn et al.
(2009) identiﬁed an association between high scores on the IM facet
(e.g., superﬁciality, deceitfulness) and reduced activity in brain regions
referred to as the moral neural circuit (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex,
posterior cingulate, and angular gyrus); an association that was not
found with the remaining facets. Not only does this suggest that reduc-
tions in emotional responsivity impair moral decision-making, but that
the interpersonal manipulative characteristics of psychopathy may
drive this association (Glenn et al., 2009). Thus, disregarding the impact
of their actions on othersmay lead individuals higher in psychopathy to
make immoral decisions and endorse harmful behavior. Although evi-
dence suggests that the association between psychopathy and moral
reasoningmay be trait speciﬁc (Glenn et al., 2009; Patil, 2015), the char-
acteristics of psychopathy most salient to the endorsement of immoral
behavior have yet to be identiﬁed.
1.4. Objective, rationale, and hypotheses
The current study sought to identify the factors and facets of psy-
chopathy most salient to the prediction of harm endorsement during
personal-moral decision-making and whether or not this association is
moderated by gender. Although evidence suggests that psychopathy
and immoral behavior are related (e.g., Arvan, 2013), this research has
almost exclusively focused on psychopathy as a dichotomous construct
(i.e., psychopathic versus non-psychopathic), overlooking any trait spe-
ciﬁc explanations. Further, although potential gender differences have
been identiﬁed inmoral reasoning (e.g., Fumagalli et al., 2010) and psy-
chopathic behavior (e.g., Borroni, Somma, Andershed, Maffei, & Fossati,
2014), the inﬂuence of gender on the association between psychopathy
andmoral reasoning has been largely neglected. Based on the literature
discussed, it was hypothesized that men would be more willing to en-
dorse personal-moral harm thanwomen, and individuals higher in psy-
chopathy would be more willing to endorse personal-moral harm than
individuals lower in psychopathy. As research has yet to identify gender
differences in moral reasoning among individuals higher in psychopa-
thy (Aharoni et al., 2014), the current study hypothesized that men
and women higher in psychopathy would not differ in their endorse-
ment of personal-harm. Finally, considering Glenn et al. (2009) and
Patil (2015), it was hypothesized that Factor 1 and the interpersonal




The sample included 557 undergraduate students. Twenty-one par-
ticipants did not provide consent and were excluded from subsequent
analyses. Upon visual inspection of boxplots and scatter plots, and in-
spection of z-scores, two outliers (where z N 3.29; Tabachnick & Fidell,
2013) were identiﬁed on the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short
Form (SRP-SF; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2016). Leverage and
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3 .37⁎⁎ .95⁎⁎ –
4 .29⁎⁎ .92⁎⁎ .76⁎⁎ –
5 .35⁎⁎ .89⁎⁎ .95⁎⁎ .69⁎⁎ –
6 .34⁎⁎ .90⁎⁎ .93⁎⁎ .74⁎⁎ .76⁎⁎ –
7 .25⁎⁎ .85⁎⁎ .73⁎⁎ .89⁎⁎ .68⁎⁎ .70⁎⁎ –
8 .22⁎⁎ .74⁎⁎ .59⁎⁎ .84⁎⁎ .52⁎⁎ .58⁎⁎ .50⁎⁎ –
Note. MDQ = Moral Dilemma Questionnaire; SRP-SF = Self-Report Psychopathy
Scale Short Form Total Score; Factor 1 = Factor 1 psychopathy; Factor 2 = Factor 2
psychopathy; IM = interpersonal manipulation psychopathy facet; CA = callous affect
psychopathy facet; ELS = erratic lifestyle psychopathy facet; ASB = antisocial behavior
psychopathy facet.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and internal consistencies of key variables across gender.
Scale Overall Men Women
M (SD) α M (SD) α M (SD) α
SRP-SF 52.93 (15.68) .93 59.83 (16.38) .91 50.90 (14.90) .93
Factor 1 26.95 (9.39) .90 31.31 (9.67) .89 25.65 (8.92) .90
Factor 2 26.17 (8.68) .84 28.79 (7.88) .81 25.42 (7.07) .84
IM Facet 13.62 (5.37) .87 15.47 (5.76) .86 13.07 (5.12) .86
CA Facet 13.32 (4.61) .78 15.84 (4.61) .73 12.58 (4.35) .78
ELS Facet 14.87 (4.68) .79 16.60 (4.92) .78 14.37 (4.49) .79
ASB Facet 11.48 (3.99) .75 12.38 (4.40) .71 11.22 (3.83) .77
MDQ 5.30 (4.64) .87 7.38 (5.07) .88 4.67 (4.31) .86
Note. SRP-SF= Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short Form Total Score; Factor 1= Factor 1
psychopathy; Factor 2 = Factor 2 psychopathy; IM = interpersonal manipulation psy-
chopathy facet; CA= callous affect psychopathy facet; ELS= erratic lifestyle psychopathy
facet; ASB = antisocial behavior psychopathy facet; MDQ = Moral Dilemma
Questionnaire.
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mean leverage of the sample and the predicted and observed values of
the SRP-SF, respectively. Global and local inﬂuence was then examined
to determinewhether these cases impacted the omnibus results and re-
gression coefﬁcients. With a large global and local impact, these two
cases were deemed to be multivariate outliers (i.e., having an unusual
combination of scores on key variables; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013)
and were removed from further analyses. The ﬁnal sample (N = 534)
consisted of 120 men and 413 women (three participants did not dis-
close gender), ranging in age from 17 to 53 years old (M = 20.3,
SD=4.3; 25 participants did not disclose age). While most participants
were Caucasian (72.8%), the sample also included Asian (9.9%), other
(7.8%), Black (6.0%), Indian (1.7%), and Aboriginal (1.3%) participants.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Moral reasoning
Participants completed a modiﬁed version of the Moral Dilemma
Questionnaire (MDQ; Greene et al., 2001) to assess their ability to
make socially acceptable decisions when faced with a series of
personal-moral dilemmas. After reading each dilemma, participants
were asked to indicate whether it would be appropriate to engage in
certain behaviors, where zero indicated not engaging in the behavior
and one indicated engaging in the behavior. For example, after reading
a scenario where you strongly believe that “your wife no longer appreci-
ates you”, participants would be asked whether or not it would be ap-
propriate to “hire a man to rape your wife so that she will appreciate you
as you comfort her”. Although the original version of theMDQ contained
20 non-moral, 19 moral, and 25 personal-moral dilemmas, only the
personal-moral dilemmas were used in the current study. Total scores
are computed by summing the total number of yes and no responses,
where higher scores indicated a greater willingness to engage in
personal-moral transgressions.
2.2.2. Psychopathy
Psychopathy was assessed with the SRP-SF (Paulhus et al., press), a
29-item version of the SRP-III (Paulhus et al., 2016). In accordance
with the PCL-R factor structure (Hare, 2003) and the SRP-III (Paulhus
et al., 2016), the SRP-SF consists of four facets; (a) interpersonal manip-
ulation (IM), (b) callous affect (CA), (c) erratic lifestyle (ELS), and
(d) antisocial behavior (ASB). These facets can be combined to create
Factor 1 (IM and CA) and Factor 2 (ELS and ASB) scores. Each item is
scored on a Likert scale, where one indicated strongly disagreeing with
the statement and ﬁve indicated strongly agreeing with the statement.
Total psychopathy scores are computed by summing responses to all
29-items, where higher scores denote more psychopathic characteris-
tics. The SRP-III has acceptable internal consistency across samples,
(Cronbach's α= .86 to .92; Neal & Sellbom, 2012; Riopka, Coupland,
& Olver, 2015; Williams, Paulhus, & Hare, 2007).2.2.3. Procedure
Undergraduate students were recruited to participate online via
an electronic research bulletin and provided with course credit for
their participation. Upon registering in the study, participants were
redirected to a consent form and made aware that they could leave
the study at any time without being penalized. Those who provided
consent were directed to a demographic questionnaire and asked to
complete the SRP-SF, MDQ, Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis,
1980), Antisocial Behavior Scale (Forth & Brown, 1993), Hostile Attribu-
tion Inventory (Epps & Kendall, 1995), Protective Factors Questionnaire
(Forth & Armstrong, 2006), respectively. Only responses associated
with the SRP-SF andMDQwere examined for the purpose of the current
study. Once complete, participants were presented with a debrieﬁng
form and the data was stripped of any identifying information.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics and internal consistencies for the MDQ as well
as psychopathy total, factor, and facet scores were calculated for the
overall sample and separately for men and women (see Table 1). All
measures used in the current study had acceptable to excellent internal
consistency overall and across gender.
3.2. AUC
Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC)
analysis was conducted to examine the association between gender
and personal-moral transgressions, as AUCs are recommended over cor-
relational analyses when one variable is dichotomous (Babchishin &
Helmus, 2015). The 95% conﬁdence interval calculated with each AUC
is interpreted as signiﬁcant when .50 is not included, as .50 is indicative
of chance. Results suggest that men are more likely than women to en-
dorse personal-harm as a means of achieving certain beneﬁcial out-
comes (AUC = .66, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.60, 0.72], p b .01).
3.3. Correlations
To examine the association between psychopathy and personal-
moral transgressions a series of bivariate correlations were conducted
(see Table 2). Moderate positive correlations were identiﬁed between
moral transgressions and total psychopathy scores (r = .36, 95% CI
[0.28, 0.44], p b .01). Consistently, Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy
scores were moderately positively associated with endorsement of
personal-moral transgressions (rF1 = .37, 95% CI [0.29, 0.45], p b .01;
rF2= .29, 95% CI [0.20, 0.37], p b .01, respectively). Finally, small tomod-
erate positive correlations were identiﬁed between the psychopathy
Table 3
Hierarchical multiple linear regression predicting transgressions from the SRP-SF total, gender, and the SRP-SF by gender interaction.
Predictor Model 1 Model 2
B(SE) t 95% CI B(SE) t 95% CI
Gender 1.77(.51)⁎⁎ 3.50 [0.78, 2.77] 1.79(.53)⁎⁎ 3.39 [0.75, 2.82]
SRP-SF 0.10(.01)⁎⁎ 7.02 [0.07, 0.12] 0.10(.02)⁎⁎ 6.01 [0.07, 0.13]
SRP-SF × Gen −0.00(.03) −0.11 [−0.06, 0.06]
R2 .16 0.16
ΔR2 .10 0.00
Note. Psychopathywasmean centered; SRP-SF= Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Short Form Total Score; SRP-SF ×Gen= interaction between the SRP-SF and gender;ΔR2=change in R2;
SE = standard error; 95% CI = 95% conﬁdence interval.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
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95% CI [0.27, 0.43], p b .01; rCA = .34, 95% CI [0.25, 0.42], p b .01;
rELS = .25, 95% CI [0.15, 0.33], p b .01; rASB = .22, 95% CI [0.13, 0.31],
p b .01, respectively). Overall, the results suggest that individuals who
score higher on psychopathy are more likely to endorse personal-
moral transgressions.3.4. Logistic regression analysis
A series of hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted
to determinewhether endorsement of personal-harm could be predict-
ed fromgender, psychopathy (i.e., total, factor, and facet scores), and the
accompanying gender by psychopathy interactions. All assumptions un-
derlying linear regression were satisﬁed (e.g., normally distributed er-
rors, linearity, independence of errors, multicollinearity; Fields, 2012).
The ﬁrst multiple regression examined whether gender, total psy-
chopathy (centered), and the gender by psychopathy interaction were
predictive of personal-moral transgressions (see Table 3). As the inter-
action between total psychopathy scores and genderwas not signiﬁcant
(B=−0.00, p= .92), the individual predictors included in model one
will be the focus of interpretation. According to the Omnibus test, the
predictors included inmodel one signiﬁcantly explained 16% of the var-
iance in personal-moral harm endorsement (F (2, 416) = 38.51,
p b .01). After controlling for psychopathy, gender was identiﬁed as a
signiﬁcant predictor of personal-moral harm endorsement (B = 1.77,
p b .01) and uniquely accounted for 17% of the variance in moral trans-
gressions. Consistent with the AUC analysis, this result suggests that
men are more likely than women to endorse personal-moral harm.
After controlling for gender, total psychopathy was also a signiﬁcant
predictor of personal-moral harm endorsement, (B = 0.10, p b .01)
and uniquely accounted for 33% of the variance in moral transgressions.
Thus, people higher on psychopathy are more likely to endorse
personal-harm than people lower on psychopathy. Notably, the non-
signiﬁcant interaction between gender and psychopathy (p= .92) sug-
gests that the likelihood of men higher in psychopathy endorsing
personal-moral transgressions was similar to the likelihood of women
higher in psychopathy.Table 4
Hierarchical multiple linear regression predicting transgressions from Factor 1 and Factor 2, ge
Predictor Model 1
B(SE) t 95% CI
Gender 1.67(.50)⁎⁎ 3.30 [0.68, 2
Factor 1 0.18(.40)⁎⁎ 5.25 [0.12, 0





Note. Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy were mean centered; F1 × Gender = interaction betw
chopathy and gender; ΔR2 = change in R2; SE = standard error; 95% CI = 95% conﬁdence int
⁎⁎ p b .01.The second multiple linear regression analysis explored whether
Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy (centered), gender, and the gender
by Factor interactions predicted personal-moral harm (see Table 4).
Again, as the interactions between psychopathy Factor scores and gen-
der were not signiﬁcant in model two (BF1 × Gender = 0.02, p = .87;
BF2 × Gender = −0.02, p = .85, respectively), model one will be the
focus of interpretation. The results of the Omnibus test suggest that gen-
der and the psychopathy Factor scores signiﬁcantly accounted for 17% of
the variance in moral transgressions (F (3, 415) = 28.53, p b .01). After
controlling for Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy, genderwas identiﬁed
as a signiﬁcant predictor of personal-moral harm endorsement (B =
1.67, p b .01), uniquely accounting for 16% of the variance in moral
transgressions. Again, this suggests that men are more likely than
women to endorse personal-moral harm. After controlling for gender
and Factor 2 psychopathy, uniquely accounting for 25% of the variance
inmoral transgressions, Factor 1 psychopathywas identiﬁed as a signif-
icant predictor of personal-moral harm endorsement (B=0.18, p b .01)
after controlling for gender and Factor 2 psychopathy. This suggests that
people higher on Factor 1 psychopathy are more likely to endorse
personal-moral harm. Interestingly, after controlling for gender and
Factor 1 psychopathy, Factor 2 psychopathy did not signiﬁcantly predict
personal-moral transgressions (B=−0.01, p= .74).
The ﬁnal multiple linear regression analysis explored whether the
facets of psychopathy (centered), gender, and the gender by facet inter-
actions predicted personal-harm endorsement (see Table 5). Again, as
the two-way interactions entered in model two were non-signiﬁcant,
model one will be the focus of interpretation (BIM × Gender = 0.08,
p = .58; BCA × Gender =−0.10, p = .62; BELS × Gender = 0.00, p = .98;
BASB × Gender=−0.01, p= .96, respectively). TheOmnibus test suggests
that gender and the psychopathy facets signiﬁcantly predict personal-
harm endorsement (F (5, 413) = 17.33, p b .01), accounting for 17% of
the variance in moral transgressions. After controlling for the psychop-
athy facets, gender was a signiﬁcant predictor of personal-harm en-
dorsement (B = 1.78, p b .01) and uniquely accounted for 17% of the
variance in moral transgressions. Among the psychopathy facets, only
the IM facet was a signiﬁcant predictor of personal-harm endorsement
after controlling for gender and the remaining facets (B = .23,
p b .01), accounting for 18% of the variance in moral transgressions.nder, and the Factor 1 by gender and Factor 2 by gender interactions.
Model 2
B(SE) t 95% CI
.66] 1.66(.53)⁎⁎ 3.16 [0.63, 2.69]
.25] 0.18(.04)⁎⁎ 4.49 [0.10, 0.26]
.07] −0.01(.05) −0.20 [−0.11, 0.09]
0.01(.08) 0.17 [−0.15, 0.18]
−0.02(.10) −0.19 [−0.21, 0.18]
.17
.00
een Factor 1 psychopathy and gender; F2 × Gender = interaction between Factor 2 psy-
erval.
Table 5
Multiple linear regression predicting moral transgressions from SRP-SF facet scores, gender, and the interactions between SRP-SF facets and gender.
Predictor Model 1 Model 2
B(SE) t 95% CI B t 95% CI
Gender 1.78(0.52)⁎⁎ 3.45 [0.76, 2.79] 1.84(.55)⁎⁎ 0.55 [0.76, 2.93]
IM 0.23(0.06)⁎⁎ 3.78 [0.11, 0.36] 0.21(.07)⁎⁎ 0.07 [0.06, 0.36]
CA 0.12(.08) 1.47 [−0.04, 0.28] 0.15(.10) 0.10 [−0.04, 0.33]
ELS −0.04(.07) −0.62 [−0.17, 0.09] −0.04(.07) 0.07 [−0.18, 0.11]
ASB 0.03(.07) 0.40 [−0.11, 0.16] 0.03(.08) 0.08 [−0.13, 0.19]
IM × Gender 0.08(.14) 0.14 [−0.19, 0.34]
CA × Gender −0.10(.19) 0.19 [−0.47, 0.28]
ELS × Gender 0.00(.16) 0.16 [−0.31, 0.32]
ASB × Gender −0.01(.15) 0.15 [−0.30, 0.29]
R2 .17 .17
ΔR2 .12 .00
Note. IM, CA, ELS, and ASBweremean centered; IM× Gender= interaction between the IM facet and gender; CA× Gender= interaction between the CA facet and gender; ELS × Gender
= interaction between the ELS facet and gender; ASB × Gender = interaction between the ASB facet and gender; ΔR2 = change in R2; SE = standard error; 95% CI = 95% conﬁdence
interval.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
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more likely to endorse personal-harm.
4. Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to identify the factors and
facets of psychopathy most salient to the prediction of harm en-
dorsement during personal-moral decision-making and to identify
whether gender moderated this association. Consistent with previous
research (e.g., Fumagalli et al., 2010), analyses indicated higher rates
of personal-harm endorsement among men than women. This ﬁnding
offers a potential explanation for why men tend to be more aggressive
than women (e.g., Sabol et al., 2007). Analyses also indicated that indi-
viduals higher on psychopathy were more likely to endorse personal-
harm. This is not surprising given the consistent association between
psychopathy and immoral behavior identiﬁed in the literature
(e.g., Arvan, 2013; Patil, 2015). While gender and psychopathy individ-
ually predicted moral transgressions, the interaction between gender
and psychopathy was not signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the results
of Aharoni et al. (2014), and provides further evidence that individuals
higher in psychopathy are more likely to endorse personal-harm, re-
gardless of gender.
To identify the traits that best predict personal-harm endorsement, a
series of hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted with
the psychopathy factors and facets. Although bivariate correlations indi-
cated that both factors were associated with transgressions, regression
analysis revealed Factor 1 as the sole predictor of personal-harm en-
dorsement after controlling for gender and Factor 2. Consistent with
Patil (2015), individuals higher on Factor 1 (interpersonal and affective
features) were more likely to endorse personal-harm than individuals
lower on Factor 1. Upon further breaking down this association,
the IM facet of psychopathy was identiﬁed as the sole predictor of
personal-harm endorsement after controlling for gender and the re-
maining three facets. Consistent with Glenn et al. (2009), this suggests
that the interpersonal manipulative characteristics of psychopathy
drive involvement in immoral behavior. This is not surprising as the
IM facet is most strongly associated with instrumental violence
(e.g., Walsh, Swogger, & Kosson, 2009). Thus, individuals higher in psy-
chopathy may be more willing to engage in personal-harm as they do
not care about the impact of their actions on others and focus exclusive-
ly on personal gain.
As the current study utilized a convenience sample of university stu-
dents to assess subclinical psychopathy, the results may not be general-
izable to clinical populations. It is possible that a stronger effect exists in
a clinical sample as extreme psychopathic traits and experience with
immoral behavior ismore prevalent. Although the association identiﬁed
in the current study is consistentwith research utilizing both subclinicaland clinical samples (e.g., Arvan, 2013; Patil, 2015), future research
should replicate these results with other samples. Finally, the use of
self-report measures to assess psychopathy (i.e., SRP-SF; Paulhus et al.,
2016) and moral reasoning (i.e., MDQ; Greene et al., 2001) was
concerning as socially desirable respondingmay have biased the results.
While social desirability does not appear to affect the results of psy-
chopathy research with student samples (Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001),
future research may beneﬁt from the inclusion of a social desirability
measure and alternative measurement techniques beyond self-
report (e.g., interviews).
Taken together, the results of the current study suggest that moral
decisions can be impacted by individual differences in psychopathic
traits. In particular, the interpersonal manipulative characteristics of
psychopathy appear to drive the endorsement of personal-harm. Al-
though more research is needed to generalize these results, it may be
possible to reduce involvement in harmful behavior by targeting inter-
personal characteristics in treatment. Not only has themanipulative in-
terpersonal style of individuals higher in psychopathy been strongly
associated with instrumental violence (Walsh et al., 2009), but research
from the general correctional literature also provides evidence that re-
ducing antisocial attitudes in treatment can effectively reduce criminal
behavior (e.g., Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Further, it is important that fu-
ture research examining the association between psychopathy and
moral reasoning consider trait speciﬁc characteristics rather than psy-
chopathy as a whole. With evidence that the IM facet drives the associ-
ation between psychopathy and harm, research would be limited if the
individual effect of psychopathic traits was not considered. Overall, the
results of the current study inform the understanding of mechanisms
that inﬂuencemoral transgressions and traits thatmay drive individuals
higher in psychopathy to engage in immoral behavior at a dispropor-
tionate rate.
References
Aharoni, E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Kiehl, K. A. (2014). What's wrong? Moral
understanding in psychopathic offenders. Journal of Research in Personality, 53,
175–181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jrp.2014.10.002.
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2010). Rehabilitating criminal justice policy and practice.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16, 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0018362.
Archer, J. (2004). Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings: A meta-analytic
review. Review of General Psychology, 8, 291–322.
Arvan, M. (2013). Bad news for the conservatives? Moral judgments and the Dark Triad
personality traits: A correlational study. Neuroethics, 6, 307–318. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s12152-011-9140-6.
Babchishin, K. M., & Helmus, L. M. (2015). The inﬂuence of base rates on correlations: An
evaluation of proposed alternative effect sizes with real-world data. Behavior
Research Methods. Advanced online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13428-
015-0627-7.
Bartel, D. M., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011). The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality
traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Cognition, 121(1), 154–161.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010.
252 M.B. Ritchie, A.E. Forth / Personality and Individual Differences 94 (2016) 247–252Beryl, R., Chou, S., & Vollm, B. (2014). A systematic review of psychopathy in women
within secure settings. Personality and Individual Differences, 71, 185–195.
Blair, R. J. R. (2007). The amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in morality and
psychopathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 387–392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
tics.2007.07.003.
Blais, J., Solodukhin, E., & Forth, A. E. (2014). A meta-analysis exploring the relationship
between psychopathy and instrumental versus reactive violence. Criminal Justice
and Behaviour, 41, 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0093854813519629.
Boronni, S., Somma, A., Andershed, H., Maffei, C., & Fossati, A. (2014). Psychopathy dimen-
sions, Big Five traits, and dispositional aggression in adolescence: Issues of gender
consistency. Personality and Individual Differences, 66, 199–203.
Cima, M., Tonnaer, F., & Hauser, M. D. (2010). Psychopaths know right from wrong but
don't care. Scan, 5, 59–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsp051.
Clapton, A., & Sorrell, G. T. (1993). Gender differences in moral reasoning: Stable or
situational? Psychology of Women Quarterly, 17, 85–101.
Cleckley, H. (1941). The mask of sanity. St. Louis: Mosby.
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy.
JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
Epps, J. B., & Kendall, P. C. (1995). Hostile attributional bias in adults. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 19(2), 159–178.
Fields, A. (2012). Discovering statistics using SPSS. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
Incorporated.
Forth, A. E., & Armstrong, I. (2006). Protective factors questionnaire. Unpublished
manuscript. Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University.
Forth, A. E., & Brown, S. E. (1993). Antisocial behaviour scale. Unpublished manuscript.
Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University.
Fumagalli, M., Ferrucci, R., Mameli, F., Marceglia, S., Mrakic-Sposta, S., Zago, S., ... Priori, A.
(2010). Gender-related differences in moral judgments. Cognitive Processing, 11,
219–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0335-2.
Galotti, K. M. (1989). Gender differences in self-reported moral reasoning: A review and
new evidence. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 18(5), 475–488.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Glenn, A. L., Iyer, R., Graham, J., Koleva, S., & Haidt, J. (2009a). Are all types of morality
compromised in psychopathy? Journal of Personality Disorders, 23, 384–398. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1521/pedi.2009.23.4.384.
Glenn, A. L., Raine, A., & Schug, R. A. (2009b). The neural correlates of moral decision-
making in psychopathy. Molecular Psychiatry, 14(1), 5–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/
mp.2008.104.
Greene, J. D., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517–523. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02011-9.
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI
investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105–2108.
Hare, R. D. (1991). Manual for the revised psychopathy checklist (1st ed.). Toronto, ON:
Multi-Health Systems.
Hare, R. D. (2003). The hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (2nd ed.). Toronto, ON:
Multi-Health Systems.
Hare, R. D. (2006). Psychopathy: A clinical and forensic overview. Forensic Psychiatry,
29(3), 709–724. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psc.2006.04.007.Kohlberg, L. (1984). Philosophy of moral development: The psychology of moral
development. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Kosson, D. S., Neumann, C. S., Forth, A. E., Salekin, R. T., Hare, R. D., Krischer, M. K., &
Sevecke, K. (2013). Factor structure of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version
(PCL:YV) in adolescent females. Psychological Assessment, 25, 71–83. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1037/a0028986.
Leistico, A. R., Salekin, R., DeCoster, J., & Rogers, R. (2008). A large-scale meta-analysis re-
lating the Hare measures of psychopathy to antisocial conduct. Law and Human
Behaviour, 32, 28–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9096-6.
Levenston, G. K., Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2000). The psychopath as ob-
server: Emotion and attention in picture processing. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
109(3), 373–385. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.109.3.373.
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Hess, T. H. (2001). Psychopathic personality traits and somatization: Sex
differences and the mediating role of negative emotionality. Journal of
Psychopathology and Behavioural Assessment, 23(1), 11–24.
Maibom, H. L. (2014). Empathy and morality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Milanowicz, A., & Bokus, B. (2013). Gender and moral jugements: The role of who is
speaking to whom. Journal of Gender Studies, 22(4), 423–443. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/09589236.2012.719314.
Neal, T. M. S., & Sellbom, M. (2012). Examining the factor structure of the Hare Self-Report
Psychopathy Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 94, 244–253. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/00223891.2011.648294.
Neumann, C. S., Kosson, D. S., & Salekin, R. T. (2007). Exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor
analysis of the psychopathy construct: Methodological and conceptual issues. In C. S.
Neumann, D. S. Kosson, & R. T. Salekin (Eds.), The psychopath: theory, research, and
practice (pp. 79–104). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Patil, I. (2015). Trait psychopathy and utilitarian moral judgment: The mediating role of
action aversion. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 27(3), 349–366. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/20445911.2015.1004334.
Paulhus, D. L., Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. (2016).Manual for the self-report psychopathy
scale. Toronto, ON: Multi-Health Systems.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York, NY: Free Press.
Riopka, S. J., Coupland, R. B. A., & Olver, M. E. (2015). Self-reported psychopathy and its
association with criminal cognition and antisocial behavior in a sample of undergrad-
uate students. Canadian Journal of Behavioual Science/Revue Canadienne Des Sciences
Du Comportement, 47(3), 216–225.
Sabol, W., Couture, H., & Harrison, P. M. (2007). Prisoners in 2006. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). Boston:
Pearson.
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Walsh, Z., Swogger, M. T., & Kosson, D. S. (2009). Psychopathy and instrumental violence:
Facet level relationships. Journal of Personality Disorders, 23(4), 416–424. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1521/pedi.2009.23.4.416.
Williams, K. M., Paulhus, D. L., & Hare, R. D. (2007). Capturing the four-factor structure of
psychopathy in college students via self-report. Journal of Personality Assessment,
88(2), 205–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223890701268074.
